Syria under Pinheiro: Reformulating Syrian Domestic Law for Decentralized Reconstruction by Somi, George
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 43 | Issue 2 Article 16
6-1-2018
Syria under Pinheiro: Reformulating Syrian
Domestic Law for Decentralized Reconstruction
George Somi
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Housing
Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, Land Use Law
Commons, Legal History Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace
Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
George Somi, Syria under Pinheiro: Reformulating Syrian Domestic Law for Decentralized Reconstruction, 43 Brook. J. Int'l L. 717 (2018).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol43/iss2/16
SYRIA UNDER PINHEIRO:
REFORMULATING SYRIAN DOMESTIC
LAW FOR DECENTRALIZED
RECONSTRUCTION
INTRODUCTION
even-year-old Ahmad was home when a bomb struck his
MamiHh’s Jo&se in a 8h'ian Qith QaHHeO WOHil^1 Shrapnel
struck the young boy in the head, yet he survived.2 His youngest
brother, however, perished, and now without a home, Ahmad
and the remnants of his family had no choice but to flee Syria.3
In 2015, after several weeks of outdoor journeying, Ahmad lay
among thousands of other refugees on an asphalt highway lead-
ing to Röszke, Hungary.4
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (UNCHR), since 2011, the Syrian conflict5 has generated
roughly 5.4 million refugees like Ahmad.6 Furthermore, approx-
imately 6.5 million people, including 2.8 million children, are
1. Magnus Wennman, Where the Children Sleep, UNHCR (June 2016),
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/stories/2016/6/5702c1594/where-the-chil-
dren-sleep.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. The Syrian conflict is a multi-sided armed struggle in Syria being waged
between the government of President Bashar al-Assad, its allies, and various
forces opposing the government. Lucy Rodgers et al., Syria: The Story of the
Conflict, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-
east-26116868. One simplistic explanation of Syria’s unrest is that it was part
of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. Id. The conflict grew out of discontent with
the Syrian government and mushroomed into armed conflict after democratic
protests were violently suppressed by the Syrian military and intelligence ser-
vices. Id. The war has mushroomed into a brutal proxy war that includes re-
gional and world powers, such as the United States, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Qa-
tar, Turkey, and Iran, as well as transnational non-state actors, such as the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Font
(currently rebranded as Jabhet Fateh al-Sham and part of Hay’at Tahrir al-
Sham). Id.
6. SYRIAN REGIONAL REFUGEE RESPONSE INTER-AGENCY INFORMATION
SHARING PORTAL, UNHCR, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php
(last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
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internally displaced within Syria, making it the largest inter-
nally displaced population in the world.7
A relatively small number of return migrations to Syria have
already taken place, but those numbers constitute a paltry
amount compared to the total number of displaced individuals.8
Thus far, approximately 556,000 Syrians have reportedly re-
turned.9 Of the total returnees, 93 percent—525,000 people—
have returned to their own homes.10 The greatest proportion of
returns have occurred in Aleppo and Hama.11 9et&'nees’ seQonO
most common mode of shelter is taking up residence in aban-
doned buildings, with approximately 20,000 individuals opting
for this type of shelter.12 About 1,000 returnees have returned to
life in formal collective centers and camps in their hometowns.13
This Note operates under the assumption that reconstruction
is a process that begins during war. It is imperative, then, that
policymakers, negotiators, and lawmakers re*'esentinL 8h'ia’s
warring parties debate and negotiate existing Syrian domestic
law, which appears likely to persist in some form. The more fa-
miliar these stakeholders are with the opportunities and flaws
in Syrian law, the more they will be able to anticipate and ac-
commodate the rights of displaced Syrians and Syrian refugees.
8h'ia’s ToQaH AOminist'ati%e Tajb TeLisHati%e reQ'ee Taj G\?b
if amended to democratize the institution of the Syrian gover-
norship, could be an effective starting point that presents decen-
tralization as a pivotal tool to empower sustainable reconstruc-
tion efforts for refugees and displaced persons. Its incorporation,
aHonLsiOe jitJ an amenOeO %e'sion oM 8h'ia’s :&lHiQ-Private
Partnership Law, Legislative Decree Law 5, could safeguard
aLainst al&ses Oi'eQteO aLainst 'eM&Lees’ anO Ois*HaQeO *e'sons’
rights under the Principles on Housing and Property Restitution
for Refugees and Displaced Persons f7:inJei'o :'inQi*Hes5d^
Part I of this Note will explore the extensive destruction that
Syria has sustained during the ongoing conflict. It will uncover
7. UNHCR, THEUNREFUGEE AGENCY: SYRIA, http://www.unhcr.org/sy/29-
internally-displaced-people.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
8. WORLD BANK GROUP, THE TOLL OF WAR: THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA 53 (2017).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. There have been 332,000 returns to Aleppo and 61,000 returns to Hama.
Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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the immense task of reconstruction, which Syria is ill-equipped
to address alone, and explore the interplay of politics that will
ultimately decide the reconstruction debate.14 Part II will detail
tJe Jisto'h oM 8h'ians’Xo&sinLb TanO anO :'o*e'th fXT:d 'iLJts^
It will also explain the causes of the rapid urbanization and pro-
liferation of informal housing that led to mass discontent in the
country. Part III will analyze the Pinheiro Principles and argue
that while they provide valuable contributions to an increasing
understanding of the needs of post-conflict societies, room may
be allotted to tailor a more context-specific approach to remedy-
ing the rights of displaced Syrian persons and refugees. Finally,
Part IV will analyze and prescribe amendments and additions to
existing Syrian domestic law so that it better conforms to the
end goals of the Pinheiro Principles.15 The principles of decen-
t'aHigation inJe'ent in 8h'ia’s ToQaH AOminist'ati%e Tajb if
amended to democratize the institution of the Syrian governor-
sJi*b Qan le jieHOeO to 'eMo'm 8h'ia’s :&lHiQ-Private Partner-
ship Law. This, in turn, would safeguard against abuses directed
at refugees and displaced persons and strengthen ordinary Syr-
ians’ %oiQes in tJe OeHile'ations QonQe'ninL tJei' Qo&nt'h’s lot`
tom-up reconstruction.
I. SYRIA’SWARTIMEDESTRUCTION AND CURRENT
RECONSTRUCTION INITIATIVES
The Syrian conflict has had severe repercussions on the coun-
t'h’s Jo&sinL inM'ast'&Qt&'e^ Wn &'lan a'eas, the World Bank
14. Aron Lund, Rebuilding Syria’s Rubble as the Cannons Roar, IRIN (Mar.
8, 2017), https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/03/08/rebuilding-
syria%E2%80%99s-rubble-cannons-roar.
15. This Note’s intention is to carve out a unique solution that deserves con-
sideration by various actors, parties, and sides in the Syrian conflict and which
prioritizes salvaging rights and dignity for the Syrian people. It tries to steer
clear from falling victim to what Bassam Haddad has called the 7increasing
gravitation toward two mutually exclusive narratives: (a) that [narrative prop-
agated by opponents of the current Syrian government and their backers] of
3pure and consistent revolution,’ and (b) that [narrative propagated by the Syr-
ian government and its allies] of 3external conspiracy.’5 Bassam Haddad, The
Debate Over Syria Has Reached a Dead End, NATION (Oct. 18, 2016),
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-debate-over-syria-has-reached-a-dead-
end/. While 7[b]oth narratives carry grains of truth,5 they are 7encumbered by
maximalist claims and fundamental blind spots that forfeit any common
ground necessary for enduring cease-fires or potential transitions, as well as
postwar reconciliation.5 Id.
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estimates16 that a total of 316,649 housing units have been ex-
posed to impact from war, with 78,339 residential units de-
stroyed and 238,311 units partially damaged.17 According to the
Wo'HO !ank’s assessments in ten 8h'ian Qitiesb E? *e'Qent of all
housing has been impacted, of which 20 percent is partially dam-
aged and 7 percent is completely destroyed.18 Further gover-
norate-level assessments19 reveal that the housing damage
aQ'oss 8h'ia’s eiLJt most im*aQteO Lo%e'no'ates is estimateO at
649,449 partially damaged residential units and 220,826 de-
stroyed residential units.20 Almost one-third of all housing in
these governorates has been impacted, with 23 percent partially
damaged and 9 percent destroyed.21
Large-scale forced population transfers in 8h'iab te'meO 7'eQ`
onQiHiation anO e%aQ&ation522 policies, have also facilitated the
displacement of Syrians and the demographic makeover of en-
tire neighborhoods and cities.23 For instance, in August 2016,
16. The World Bank’s city-level damage assessments represent a January
2017 estimate for the following ten cities: Aleppo, Dar’a, Deir ez-Zor, Douma,
Hama, Homs, Idlib, Kobane, Raqqa, and Tadmur (Palmyra). WORLD BANK
GROUP, supra note 8, at 20. In this study, physical damage was assessed
through remote-sensing techniques and verified using public information
channels, such as social media analytics, local news, and other media outlets.
Id.
17. Id. at 22.
18. In the World Bank’s study, the physical state of each residential unit
was classified according to the following three categories: (1) no damage, (2)
partially damaged (less than 40 percent damage), and (3) destroyed (greater
than 40 percent damage). Id. Aleppo, Syria’s largest city, bears the largest
share of the country’s damaged urban housing at 64 percent, while Homs con-
stitutes the second most housing damage at 16 percent. Id. The level of housing
destruction varies across cities, as destroyed housing percentages range be-
tween 3 percent in cities like Dar’a and Hama and up to 10 percent in Deir ez-
Zor. Id. at 21N22. The percentage of partially damaged housing units ranges
from 2.5 percent in Hama to approximately 33 percent in Tadmur. Id.
19. Syria’s eight most affected governorates are: Aleppo, Dar’a, Deir ez-Zor,
Hama, Homs, Idlib, Rif Dimashq, and Raqqa. Id. at 20. To assess these gover-
norates, the World Bank studied city-level damage and relied on the 7intensity
and composition of conflict in cities and corresponding governorates, as well as
the baseline differences between initial stocks of infrastructure.5 Id.
20. Id. at 22.
21. Id.
22. Emma Beals, Syria’s Cruel ‘Reconciliations,’ DAILY BEAST (Apr. 21,
2017), http://www.thedailybeast.com/syrias-cruel-reconciliations.
23. For an in-depth discussion pertaining to population transfers in Syria,
particularly in the context of the April 2017 7Four Towns5 agreement between
the Syrian government, Hezbollah, and Iran, on one side, and opposition
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mo'e tJan D\\ W'a(i 8Ji’a MamiHies mo%eO to jJat je'e once re-
bel-held neighborhoods in Darayya, a suburb of Damascus, as
part of a surrender deal that would allow up to 700 rebel fighters
to relocate to the Idlib Province.24 In April 2017, a total of 8,000
residents from the villages of Foua and Kefraya, besieged by
anti-government rebels, were permitted to head towards Aleppo,
while 3,000 evacuees from Zabadani, Madaya, and surrounding
areas, besieged by the Syrian army, were allowed to depart to-
wards Idlib.25
9el&iHOinL 8h'ia’s inM'ast'&Qt&'eb Jomesb anO l&sinesses will
be an immense task, with cost estimates ranging between $250N
$350 billion USD.26 According to Abdullah al-Dardari, the Dep-
uty Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic and So-
cial Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), in order to simply
resto'e 8h'ia’s L'oss OomestiQ *'oO&Qt to its *'eja' He%eH oM .@\
billion USD, $180 billion USD of investment would be needed.27
groups Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham, on the other, see Annabelle
Böttcher, Large-Scale Forced Population Transfers in Syria: Details of the Re-
cent “Four Towns Agreement,5 SYDDANSK UNIVERSITET CENTER FOR
MELLEMØSTSTUDIER (May 2017), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Anna-
belle_Boettcher/publication/316809393_Large-scale_forced_population_trans-
fers_in_Syria_details_of_the_recent_four_towns_agree-
ment/links/59124722aca27200fe493635/Large-scale-forced-population-trans-
fers-in-Syria-details-of-the-recent-four-towns-agreement.pdf. See also Mays
Al-Shobassi, Timeline: Syria’s 13 ‘People Evacuation’ Deals, AL JAZEERA (May
16, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/timeline-syria-
people-evacuation-deals-170413084313089.html (providing overview of Syria’s
thirteen evacuation deals, as of May 2017); SYRIA INST., NO RETURN TO HOMS:
A CASE STUDY ONDEMOGRAPHICENGINEERING IN SYRIA (2017), http://syriainsti-
tute.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/02/PAX_REPORT_Homs_FINAL_web_single_page.pdf (exploring
mechanisms and impacts of state-directed population displacement in Syria
through the Homs case study).
24. Martin Chulov, Iran Repopulates Syria with Shia Muslims to Help
Tighten Regime’s Control, GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2017/jan/13/irans-syria-project-pushing-population-shifts-to-in-
crease-influence.
25. First Phase of Syria Evacuations Ends After Delay, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 21,
2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/phase-syria-evacuations-ends-
delay-170421144317350.html.
26. Lund, supra note 14.
27. David Butter, Salvaging Syria’s Economy, CHATHAM HOUSE 3, (Mar.
2017), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publica-
tions/research/2016-03-15-syria-economy-butter.pdf. For perspective, after
World War II, the United States contributed $13 billion USD to the Marshall
Plan to rebuild Europe. Perry Cammack, The Staggering Price of Syria’s
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The task will be daunting, especially considering that the Syrian
state’s l&OLet Mo' E\G? jas a**'oiimateHh .A liHHion 48r^28
While the fighting in the Syrian war is not over, the Syrian
government and the international community have already
started to contemplate postwar reconstruction and even war-
time reconstruction.29 It appears that Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad will, at a minimum, remain in charge of at least what
Jas leen te'meO 74seM&H 8h'ia5—the Syrian capital of Damascus
and the major cities of Aleppo, Hama, and Homs—as well as
most of the population,30 most of the economy, the central gov-
e'nment l&'ea&Q'aQhb anO 8h'ia’s seat in the United Nations
General Assembly.31 The Geneva Talks have indicated that even
AssaO’s enemies Ja%e sJiMteO M'om tJe iOea oM a *oHitiQaH t'ansi`
tion to a goal of stabilization, resettlement, and reconstruction.32
Therefore, the United States, Turkey, various Western Euro-
pean nations, and the Arab Gulf states face a predicament re-
La'OinL Joj to OeaH jitJ 8h'ia’s Lo%e'nmentb jJiQJ tJeh %iej
as an unrepentant and unreformed pariah, especially in the con-
text of economic recovery and the Syrian refugee crisis that has
spread beyond the Middle East into Europe.33
Still, reconstruction can be a lucrative, money-making scheme,
and even governments that once sided with the opposition rebels
Reconstruction, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INT’L PEACE (Feb. 11, 2016), http://car-
negieendowment.org/2016/02/11/staggering-price-of-syria-s-reconstruction-
pub-62744. This equates to $100 billion USD today, considering inflation. Id.
28. Lund, supra note 14.
29. Id.; Butter, supra note 27.
30. While the Syrian government controls 34 percent of Syrian territory,
65.5 percent of the remaining Syrian population lives in the government-held
territory. Who’s who in the Syria conflict, AL-MONITOR (Jan. 20, 2017),
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/afp/2017/01/syria-conflict-players.html.
31. See Joshua Landis, What the Rebel Loss of Aleppo Will Mean for Syria,
SYRIACOMMENT (July 29, 2016), http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/loss-aleppo-
will-mean-syrian-opposition-landis-heras-lund-abdulhamid/; Lund, supra note
14; see also Aron Lund, How Assad’s Enemies Gave Up on the Syrian Opposi-
tion, CENTURY FOUNDATION (Oct. 17, 2017), https://tcf.org/content/report/as-
sads-enemies-gave-syrian-opposition/ (detailing how and why foreign support
for Syrian opposition groups declined).
32. Aron Lund, Everything You Need to Know About the Latest Syria Peace
Talks, IRIN (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.irinnews.org/analy-
sis/2017/02/21/everything-you-need-know-about-latest-syria-peace-talks.
33. Lund, supra note 14; SYRIAN REGIONAL REFUGEE RESPONSE INTER-
AGENCY INFORMATION SHARING PORTAL, Europe: Syrian Asylum Applications,
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/asylum.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
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a'e 7anLHinL Mo' a *ieQe oM tJe aQtion^534 In February 2017, during
a %isit lh 6&'kisJ :'esiOent 9eQe* 6ahhi* ['OoCan to 8a&Oi A'a`
bia, the chairman of the Council of Saudi Chambers of Com-
merce, Abdulrahman Abdullah Al Zamil, relayed to a Turkish
nejs*a*e' tJat 7tJe ja' in 8h'ia jiHH not Hast more than a year,
and Turkey and Saudi Arabia will be the re-constructors of
8h'ia^535 At tJe momentb it is &nQe'tain Joj in%oH%eO AssaO’s o*`
ponents will be in the reconstruction process.36
8h'ia’s otJe' neiLJlo's a'e aHso *ositioninL tJemseH%es to
profit oMM oM 8h'ia’s 'eQonst'&Qtion^37 For example, in Lebanon,
the Tripoli Special Economic Zone is expanding the northern
*o't oM 6'i*oHib QiteO as a *otentiaH te'minaH in CJina’s t'iHHion-
OoHHa' 78iHk 9oaO5 *'oIeQt anO HoQateO I&st eiLJteen miHes M'om
the Syrian border, to accommodate the movement of construc-
tion material to Syria.38 The port manager, Ahmad Tamer, esti-
mates a demand for 30 million tons of annual cargo capacity, of
34. Steven Heydemann, Rules for Reconstruction in Syria, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.brook-
ings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/08/24/rules-for-reconstruction-in-syria/.
35. Id.
36. For instance, in his speech at the inauguration of the Damascus Inter-
national Exhibition—the first international trade fair hosted in Damascus
since the war started over six years ago—Assad said that Syria had 7lost its
best youth and its infrastructure,5 but had 7won a healthier and more homog-
enous society,5 prompting fears of ethnic cleansing for some analysts and crit-
ics. @AzmiBishara, TWITTER (Aug. 20, 2017, 4:06 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/AzmiBishara/status/899226148000866304. In his speech, Assad la-
beleO ['OoCan a 7political beggar5 and seemed to dismiss Turkey’s role in re-
construction. Heydemann, supra note 34. Assad asserted his vision as to how
involved his enemies could be in the Syrian reconstruction process, stating
that:
[T]here will be no security cooperation, no embassies, and no
role for some countries that say they seek a solution—only
after they sever their relations openly and unequivocally
with terrorism. . . . We will not allow enemies and adversaries
to achieve with politics what they failed to achieve with ter-
rorism.
Id.
37. Id. For example, in July 2017, the Jordan Construction Contractors As-
sociation and the Ministry of Public Works sponsored and hosted 7Syria Re-
Build 2017,5 an international reconstruction conference in Amman. Id.
38. Lebanon Prepares for Syria’s Post-War Construction Windfall, ABC
NEWS (Aug. 17, 2017), http://abcnews.go.com/amp/International/wireStory/leb-
anon-prepares-syrias-post-war-construction-windfall-49266750.
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which the city of Tripoli could provide 5 to 7 million annually.39
According to Raya al-Xasssanb Telanon’s Mo'me' MinanQe minis`
te' jJo Oi'eQts tJe 6'i*oHi 8*eQiaH [QonomiQ pone *'oIeQtb 7Tel`
anon is in front of an opportunity that it needs to take seri-
o&sHh^540
4ns&'*'isinLHhb tJe 8h'ian Lo%e'nment’s aHHies Ja%e aH'eaOh
set ink on reconstruction contracts.41 A Russian trade delegation
has set up reconstruction projects worth $2 billion USD,42 and a
Chinese-Arab business group has committed $2 billion USD to
build industrial parks in Syria.43 More than forty Iranian firms
attended the Syrian go%e'nment’s 'eo*eninL oM tJe ramasQ&s
Exhibit.44 Wn reQemle' E\G@b AOnan SaJmo&Ob 8h'ia’s Amlas`
sador to Iran, stated in a meeting with Gholamhossein Shafeyee,
the Head of the Iranian Chamber of Commerce, Industries,
Mines, and Agriculture, that Syria has prioritized the Iranian
private sector in reconstruction projects.45 As early as November
E\GAb Raman YJoHamib jJo o%e'sees W'an’s Const'&Qtion !asiI
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Putin Urges NewMarshall Plan forMiddle East to See Recovery
and Growth, TASS RUSSIANNEWS AGENCY (Oct. 27, 2016), http://tass.com/pol-
itics/909103.
42. While the Syrian government would likely afford Russian stakeholders
and institutions preferential reconstruction deals, the extent of Russia’s role
in Syria’s reconstruction remains uncertain. At a meeting of the Valdai inter-
national discussion club, Russian President, Vladimir Putin, said the following
about Syria: 7Colossal damage requires a long-term and all-round program, a
kind of the Marshall Plan to revive this war- and conflict-torn region.5 Putin
Urges New Marshall Plan for Middle East to See Recovery and Growth, supra
note 41. While it is noticeable that Putin alluded to a West-backed plan, diplo-
matic circles seem to confirm Russia’s position that other world powers fund
Syria’s reconstruction effort. Kathrin Hille et al., Russia Asks Global Powers
to Fund Syria Reconstruction, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/47933554-f847-11e6-9516-2d969e0d3b65. At a
February 2017 meeting with European Union ambassadors, Russia’s deputy
foreign minister, Mikhail Bogdanov, reportedly said that Syria’s reconstruc-
tion would soon top the global agenda. Id. Furthermore, according to the EU
diplomats, 7he said 3tens of billions of dollars’ would be needed, while warning
3nothing’ should be expected from Russia.5 Id.
43. Heydemann, supra note 34.
44. Id.
45. Envoy: Syria Prioritizes Iranian Companies for Post-War Reconstruc-
tion, FARS NEWS AGENCY (Dec. 26, 2016), http://en.farsnews.com/new-
stext.aspx?nn=13951006000476.
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(Voluntary) Organization, cited postwar Iran as a reconstruction
model for Syria.46
The ESCWA in Beirut has already established the National
Agenda for the Future of Syria Programme—a conceptual and
inclusive platform for presenting all relevant stakeholders in the
conflict with feasible solutions and scenarios.47 Even some fig-
ures within the Syrian opposition are slowly warming up to the
idea of a reconstruction model implementing an Iraq-style or
Lebanon-type power-sharing system. According to one opposi-
tion MiL&'eb 7oint is Ma' M'om iOeaHb anO not sometJinL je JaO as`
*i'eO tob l&t W tJink it is lette' tJan ja'^548
II. HISTORY OFHLP IN SYRIA
A *'o*e' in%estiLation oM tJe olstaQHes to 8h'ian 'eM&Lees’
achievement of appropriate post-conflict relief and housing res-
titution necessitates an understanding of HLP rights in prewar
Syria. Prior to the Syrian conflict, Syria was undergoing rapid
&'lanigationb 7jitJ A@ *e'Qent oM tJe *o*&Hation Hi%inL in &'lan
areas, most of which are in rain-fed agricultural regions, includ-
ing the basin of the Euphrates River, or along interior trade
'o&tes^549 8h'ia’s tjo Ha'Lest Qitiesb ramascus and Aleppo, com-
posed 37 percent of the urban population and 20 percent of the
total population.50 Approximately 3.4 million Syrians—one-
third of the urban population—lived in informal settlements51
lacking official recognition and registration.52
46. Id.
47. The National Agenda for the Future of Syria Programme, U.N. ECON. &
SOCIAL COMM’N W. ASIA, https://www.unescwa.org/sub-site/national-agenda-
future-syria (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
48. Hille et al., supra note 42.
49. WORLDBANKGROUP, supra note 8, at 21.
50. Id.
51. With a shortage of 1.5 million formal homes, many Syrians were forced
to turn to informal housing 7by squatting on land that they [did] not own (such
and is usually owned by the state) or buying a plot on private land (in which
the lack of planning permission and legal contracts means the arrangement is
informal).5 Robert Goulden, Housing, Inequality, and Economic Change in
Syria, 38 BRIT. J. MIDDLEEASTERN STUD. 187, 188 (2011).
52. Jon D. Unruh, Weaponization of the Land and Property Rights System
in the Syrian Civil War: Facilitating Restitution?, 10 J. INTERVENTION &
STATEBUILDING 453, 457 (2016). In Aleppo, almost half the population lived in
informal settlements, while about 40 percent of inhabitants in Damascus lived
in such settlements. Id.
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The prewar land tenure system53 in 8h'ia 7jas inMH&enQeO lh
the mass peasant uprisings of 1889N1890, during Ottoman
'&He^554 The land tenure in Syria was also a byproduct of the com-
munal farming systems (musha)55 that existed during Ottoman
rule.56 The musha land system, which is in many ways analo-
gous to the open fields system featured in Eighteenth and Nine-
teenth Century Europe,57 7eiisteO in jiOe t'aQts oM tJe 8h'ian
Qo&nt'hsiOe^558 Under the Land Code of 1858,59 lands in hun-
dreds of villages became the property of Sultan AlO&H XamiO’s
family and a few powerful Syrian families.60 Personal title of
ownership to these musha lands gave way to ownership by pow-
erful, yet absentee owners.61 Tribal chiefs transformed into pri-
vate owners, and their tribe members became their sharecrop-
pers.62 Musha land still existed at the eve of the Syrian conflict
anO jas at tJe Qomm&nities’ Ois*osaH Mo' L'aginL anO L'ain
threshing.63
53. Land tenure is 7the bundle of rights an individual, household or commu-
nity may have with respect to land. It includes property rights but also use
rights of a permanent or a seasonal nature.5 Nadia Forni, Land Tenure and
Labour Relations, in SYRIANAGRICULTURE AT THECROSSROADS 311 (FAO Policy
& Econ. Dev. Ser. No. 8, 2003).
54. Id. at 312. Syrian peasants who participated in the uprisings sought
protection from eviction by sheikhs. Id. They also wanted the reduction of the
sheikhs’ share to land to one-eighth and a redistribution of the rest of the land
to the peasants. Id. For a more comprehensive analysis of the Syrian peas-
antry’s economic, political, and social evolution, as well as an examination of
the peasants’ behavior in Ottoman and Mandate times, and after the
Ba`athists’ rise to power, see HANNA BATATU, SYRIA’S PEASANTRY, THE
DESCENDANTS OF ITS LESSER RURALNOTABLES, AND THEIR POLITICS (1999).
55. Musha, in Arabic, means joint or collective ownership. EVA KAPTIJN,
LIFE ON THE WATERSHED. RECONSTRUCTING SUBSISTENCE IN A STEPPE REGION
USINGARCHAEOLOGICAL SURVEY: A DIACHRONIC PERSPECTIVE ONHABITATION IN
THE JORDANVALLEY 378 (2009).
56. Forni, supra note 53, at 312N13.
57. Id. at 313.
58. Id. at 312.
59. For a deeper understanding of the 1858 Land Code and the changes in
the pre-modern Middle East’s land regimes, see NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTY AND LAND IN THEMIDDLEEAST (Roger Owen ed. 2001).
60. Forni, supra note 53, at 312N13.
61. Id. at 313.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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Land ownership in Syria under the Ottoman Empire64 and,
later, the FrenchMandate,65was unequally distributed, with big
landowners owning substantial portions of cultivable land in
Syria by the end of the 1930s.66 In the 1920s, the French author-
ities cheaply sold, leased, or gave real property that once be-
longed to the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid to big landlords and
other individuals who collaborated with the Mandate.67 By con-
trast, the small farmers who prevailed in the Druze and `Alawi
Mountains and Hawran were economically comparable to share-
croppers68 on big estates.69 The tenancy system in Syria also suf-
fered from many other flaws, including: widespread absentee
landownership; verbal tenancy contracts that were terminable
at-will by landlords; and sharecroppers who were chronically in
debt, unable to directly access the market, under-equipped, and
bound by outdated farming methods.70
64. The Majalla (Majallat al-ahkam al-’adliyya, or 7the journal of judicial
rules5) was the nineteenth-century codification of Islamic law under Ottoman
rule. CHIBLIMALLAT, INTRODUCTIONTOMIDDLEEASTERNLAW 242 (2009). It con-
sisted of an introduction and sixteen books, which 7adopted the classical lan-
guage and turn of phrase in various fields of contract, tort, and civil procedure,
drawing heavily on . . . Middle Eastern Islamic law.5 Id. at 249. The Majalla
remained the 7original fundamental legislative monument, against a back-
ground of shifting constitutional and penal laws dominated by the various
mandates and protectorates5 in many Middle Eastern countries. Id. at 253.
Syria repealed the Majalla and the statutes of the French Mandate period on
May 18, 1949 with the passage of Decree-law 84. Id. at 249.
65. Note that the legal tradition in the Middle East is based on civil law,
7with the Civil Code at the heart of the legal system.5 Id. at 184. In Middle
Eastern countries like Syria, Lebanon, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, which
were ruled with direct French civil law-based traditions, the French impact on
the legal system was 7massive and wholesale.5 Id. at 240N41.
66. See Ziad Keilany, Land Reform in Syria, 16 MIDDLEEASTERN STUD. 209
(1980).
67. Id.
68. While sharecroppers, like laborers, were subject to their landlords’ will,
a true tenant possessed land use and occupancy rights protected under the law.
Id. at 210.
69. Id. at 209. According to the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, 49 percent of the total area of privately owned land in Syria in
1952 consisted of holdings surpassing 100 hectares (1 hectare = 2.471 acres).
Id. By comparison, 82 percent of the total rural population was either landless
or owned small holdings equal to or less than 10 hectares. Id. In 1952, those
small holdings constituted only 13 percent of land in Syria. Id.
70. Id. at 210.
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introduced by President Gamal Abdel Nasser71 when Syria and
Egypt united72 to form the United Arab Republic.73 On Septem-
ber 27, 1958, Nasser enacted Agrarian Reform Law No. 161,
which expropriated 1.37 million hectares of land and barred a
person from owning more than 300 hectares of rain-fed land and
80 hectares of irrigated land.74 The program compensated land-
lords in full over a 40-year period via negotiable bonds at 1.5
percent interest, while landless peasants received plots of up to
30 hectares of non-irrigated land and up to eight hectares of ir-
rigated land.75 The land reform programs of the United Arab Re-
public, however, encountered various difficulties in Syria, and
&HtimateHhb 8h'ian HanOHo'Os 'esisteO tJe *'oL'ams’ eieQ&tion^76
After the Syrian coup of 196177 and the subsequent dissolution
of the United Arab Republic, the conservative government of
71. The land reform programs in Egypt were instituted after the 1952 Rev-
olution. Kenneth Parsons, Land Reform in the United Arab Republic, 35 LAND
ECON. 319 (1959). The program in Egypt entailed 7(a) the acquisition of culti-
vated lands from large holdings for distribution5 and 7(b) the rent regulation
programs for tenanted lands.5 Id. This program was extended to the Syrian
region. Id.
72. The United Arab Republic was the name of the state that represented a
political union between Egypt and Syria between 1958 and 1961. See Sarah
Mousa, Commemorating the United Arab Republic, ALJAZEERA (Feb. 22, 2013),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opin-
ion/2013/02/201321985412606377.html; PATRICK SEALE, THE STRUGGLE FOR
SYRIA (1965).
73. Keilany, supra note 66, at 210.
74. Id. at 211. Approximately 27 percent of the rural population and 17 per-
cent of the total population benefitted from this land reform program. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 211N12. First, Syria underwent a three-year drought that reduced
its agricultural output and rural income to less than 50 and 60 percent, respec-
tively, of that of 1957. Id. at 211. Second, while Syria’s land reform program
mimicked that of Egypt, Syria’s agriculture was more extensive than Egypt’s.
Id.; See also Parsons, supra note 71. Third, Syria’s population was uneven, as
its population was heavily concentrated in the western part of the country,
while the eastern part of the country was sparsely populated. Keilany, supra
note 66, at 212. Therefore, there was not enough expropriated land to distrib-
ute in western Syria. Id. Fourth, Syria lacked the skilled personnel to imple-
ment the program. Id.
77. Between 1949 and 1970, Syria underwent a tumultuous period of coup
d’états. Halla Diyab, On Syria’s Turbulent History of Coups, AL ARABIYA (Nov.
26, 2014), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-
east/2014/11/26/On-Syria-s-turbulent-history-of-coups.html. By some counts,
the bloodless 1970 coup executed by Lieutenant General and President-to-be
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Prime Minister Marouf Dawalibi revised the land reform law to
accommodate landowners, who complained that the ownership
limitations were too rigid and that their compensation period
lacked immediacy.78 rajaHili’s Lo%e'nment amenOeO tJe Haj so
that depending on factors, such as the nature of the land and its
irrigation method, landowners could own more land.79
When the Ba`ath Party80 assumed control of Syria in 1963,81 it
introduced, under the banner of Arab socialism, more stringent
restrictions against landowners.82 In fact, the Ba`ath accelerated
the process of land expropriation and distribution.83 By 1972,
only 239,000 hectares of the 1.37 million hectares expropriated
by the Ba`ath-dominated government remained undisturbed.84
Hafez al-Assad counted as the twentieth coup since 1949. Eric Pace, The Syria
Take-Over, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 1970), at 6. Between the 1950s and 1960s,
Syria was a weak state and, like modern-day Lebanon, subject to outside in-
tervention and frequent coups. Joshua Landis, What Will a Post Assad Syria
Look Like?, SYRIA COMMENT (May 12, 2011), http://www.joshualan-
dis.com/blog/what-will-a-post-assad-syria-look-like/. During his presidency,
Hafez al-Assad was perceived by many, including the Sunni elite, as having
brought stability to the country after more than twenty years of political chaos.
Id.
78. Keilany, supra note 66, at 212.
79. Id. For example, the amended law expanded landowners’ maximum
area of ownership to 600 hectares of non-irrigated land and 200 hectares of
irrigated land. Id.
80. The Ba`ath (7Renaissance5) Party, founded in 1947 by Michel Aflaq and
Salah al-Din al-Bitar, strove for Arab unity, secularism, socialism, and an end
to foreign colonialism. The Arab Baath Socialist Party, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 11,
2008), http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/arabun-
ity/2008/02/2008525184059317433.html.
81. The Ba`athist coup in March 1963 represented a reshuffling of Syria’s
social and political hierarchy, as `Alawi officers and other ethno-religious mi-
nority groups’ officers from the Syrian countryside broke the political monopoly
traditionally held by Syria’s Sunni-majority community. NIKOLAOS VAN DAM,
THESTRUGGLE FORPOWER IN SYRIA: POLITICS ANDSOCIETYUNDERASAD AND THE
BA’TH PARTY 31N32 (2011).
82. SYRIA LAND OWNERSHIP AND AGRICULTURAL LAWS HANDBOOK: VOLUME 1
STRATEGIC INFORMATION AND BASIC REGULATIONS 70 (Int’l Bus. Publications,
Inc. ed., 2013).
83. Keilany, supra note 66, at 212. Keilany argues that in Syria, the signif-
icance of this land reform lay mostly in its equity, rather than as a means for
boosting economic productivity. Id. at 213. The Land Reform Law introduced
by the Ba`ath Party also introduced the traditions of agricultural cooperatives
for the first time in Syria. Id. at 219. By the end of 1966, 994,058 hectares of
land was expropriated, and 232,050 hectares were distributed. Id. at 212.
84. Id. at 212N13.
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mandatory participation in agricultural cooperatives.85 Under
this decree, the beneficiaries of the allotted expropriated lands
only had to pay their cooperatives one-fourth the value of the
land received by installments over twenty years.86
6Je !amatJ’s HanO 'eMo'm *'oL'am JeH*eO to estalHisJ 73*oHiti`
cal linkage extending between the revolutionary elite and the
masses in tJei' %iHHaLes anO neiLJlo'JooOs^’587 In effect, the
!amatJ eHiminateO liL HanOHo'Os’ *oHitiQaH *'i%iHeLesb sa**eO
landlords of rural power, and extended its influence and author-
ity into villages.88 Z&'tJe'mo'eb HanO 'eMo'm inteL'ateO 8h'ia’s
rural areas with the rest of the country and developed a new so-
cioeconomic infrastructure.89 Once dominated by big landown-
e'sb 8h'ia’s LeoL'a*JiQaHHh-scattered peasants became depend-
ent on a national government.90
In the early 1980s, Syria entered into an economic crisis.91
8h'ia’s eQonomiQ *'olHems HeO to tJe QommenQement oM a sHoj
process of economic infitah, or opening-up.92 The governments of
President Hafez al-Assad and his son and successor, Bashar al-
AssaOb je'e inQ'easinLHh Mo'QeO to 'eO&Qe tJe state’s 'oHe in
85. Id. at 219.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 221.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 223. In the two decades proceeding the Ba`ath Party’s ascendancy
in Syria, GDP per capita increased almost ten-fold, infant mortality declined
by 76 percent, and adult literacy increased 40 percent. Goulden, supra note 51,
at 192. This period lowered poverty rates and transformed rural areas of the
country by introducing basic infrastructure, such as roads, water, and electric-
ity. Id. at 193. The rural electrification rate, which stood at 2 percent in 1963,
was 95 percent by 1992. Id. Such attention to agriculture not only reflected the
Ba`ath’s rural background and identity, but also helped Hafez al-Assad main-
tain popular support. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. Goulden points to the following factors to explain the causes of the
Syrian economic crisis that started in the early 1980s: the decline of external
assistance from the Soviet Union and the Gulf States, political-economic
changes in the West, loose controls on consumer imports, and the inability to
create competitive industrial exports. Id.
92. Id. For a more comprehensive grasp of the interplay between the private
sector and state-led economic growth, see BASSAM HADDAD, BUSINESS
NETWORKS IN SYRIA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE
(2011), and ALAN RICHARDS & JOHNWATERBURY, A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
MIDDLEEAST (1996).
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economic activity.93 res*ite tJese eMMo'tsb 8h'ia’s Yr: OeQHineO
by 25 percent in the 1980s, and it was not until 2004 that the
country attained its 1980 GDP level.94
As tJe *&lHiQ seQto'’s Qa*aQith OiminisJeO in Ma%o' oM a neoHil`
eral approach, informal housing settlements arose and quickly
expanded.95 While the country became predominantly urban in
the 1980s, the state lacked the capacity to systematically organ-
ize urban growth and to undertake expansive housing planning
projects.96 Law 60 of 1979 was one of a series of legal steps the
Syrian government undertook to address unplanned urban ex-
pansion. Like the other measures, however, it was inadequate.97
Law 60 required local authorities to possess undeveloped land
around major cities and towns, but many local authorities were
nearly bankrupted by compensating owners of the undeveloped
land parcels and, therefore, could not develop that expropriated
land.98 Hafez al-Assad, therefore, could only instruct local au-
tJo'ities to 7osne'%iQe eiistinL iHHeLaH a'easb l&t sto* tJei' ei*an`
sion5 to *'e%ent M&'tJe' OeLene'ation^99
In more recent years, the government attempted to boost the
*'i%ate seQto'’s in%oH%ement in property development.100 The
government tried divesting itself of the land requisitioned and
retained by the government under the Agricultural Reform Law
93. Goulden, supra note 51, at 194. Note that the Syrian government es-
chewed some of the social costs of economic liberalization by refusing to take
the following steps: 73privatization of public enterprises, liberalization of labor
and financial markets, and the reduction of government activity in the field of
social policy.’5 Id. at 194N95.
94. Id. at 194.
95. Id. at 195. Goulden argues that neoliberalism is best understood as a
political project constructed in the interests of society’s privileged class. Id. at
196. Neoliberalism 7avows minimal state intervention and maximal market
freedom.5 Id. In actuality, 7while the state’s welfare role is reduced, its coercive
capacity is maintained, and its active support and [incentivizing] of private
economic activity muddies its claims of laissez faire.5 Id.
96. Id. at 195.
97. Id.
98. Id. Furthermore, Goulden points out that 7rental laws, designed to en-
sure that tenants were protected from exploitation by landlords, simply re-
sulted in private property owners not renting out their property on terms they
considered prohibitively unprofitable.5 Id. at 195N96. Furthermore, there were
a few public housing projects undertaken, but they were poorly managed and
were the subject of corruption and profiteering at the expense of the wider pub-
lic. Id. at 196.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 197.
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of 1958 and subsequent legislative measures.101 In fact, in 2000,
Syrian Prime Minister, Muhammad Mustafa Mero, commis-
sioned a study, which recommended the resumption of the land
redistribution program.102 6Jat st&Oh’s MinOinLs je'e 'eIeQteOb
however, because the government sought to sell this land to big
investors.103 In the 2000s, under Bashar al-Assad, the govern-
ment was selling land cheaply to real estate developers, allowing
the market to determine rental prices.104
Prior to the commencement of the Syrian conflict, the Syrian
government initiated other steps that boosted private economic
activity in housing.105 For instance, the reduction of interest
rates on bank loans for housing in 2004 encouraged property in-
vestment.106 The government was also phasing out private
rental laws unfavorable to property owners.107 In addition, the
Real Estate Development and Investment Law permitted the
hiring of foreign workers and the importing of construction ma-
terial and tools for development projects.108
Z&'tJe'mo'eb tJe Lo%e'nment t'ieO 7to o&tso&'Qe tJe *'olHem
oM tJe *'i%ate seQto'^5109 The last five-year plan projected that 77
percent of new housing would be supplied commercially.110 Prior
to tJe QonMHiQtb tJe 8h'ian [QonomiQ Cente' noteO tJatb 7tJese
projects will not meet the demand for housing that we are facing,
as they involve building high-priced luxury housing aimed at the
rich classes of Syrians, expatriates, and tourists, and thus will
not Qont'il&te to soH%inL tJe Q'isis tJat je a'e taHkinL alo&t^5111
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. As of 2011, government divestment of extensive land holdings was
well-underway. Id. In 2007, a major real estate agent in Damascus observed
that 7[b]ig companies are buying the lands from the government at low prices.5
Id.
104. Id. For instance, when rent control was lifted in Hama, the prices of
state-owned land multiplied between 7N10 times. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 198. Goulden argues that the Syrian government had been influ-
enced by the work of Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, 7who popularized
the idea that the solution to informal housing lies in giving individuals formal
property rights. The market would then take care of matters, as the wealth of
their homes would be unlocked.5 Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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[trialing] the process of granting property rights to informal
dweHHe's in eiQJanLe Mo' a Mee to HoQaH a&tJo'ities^5112 While this
individualistic, market-based approach coincided with neolib-
eral orthodoxy, it failed to recognize the de facto titling system
aH'eaOh eiistinL in 8h'ia’s inMo'maH a'eas anO tJat seQ&'e de
facto tenure—with or without documents—is what matters most
to informal dwellers.113 In addition, Law 33 neglected to antici-
pate that many low-income, informal residents were uneasy
about formalization and that even if they were granted formal
property rights, they would have difficulty securing bank
loans.114
In the meantime, the Syrian government also enhanced its co-
ercive role.115 Law 1 of 2003 introduced greater fines and incar-
ceration times for all local officials and illegal builders culpable
for the construction of informal housing.116 This legislation, how-
ever, did not rectify the shortage of formal housing.117 Instead, it
resulted in higher bribes requested by local state officials from
illegal builders.118 The continued proliferation of informal hous-
ing in urban centers, fueled by unsustainable environmental
anO aL'iQ&Ht&'aH *oHiQies anO 8h'ia’s most se%e'e O'o&LJt on 'eQ`
ord between 2007N2010, contributed to the political unrest lead-
ing up to the Syrian conflict.119
III. THE CHALLENGES OF SYRIA UNDER THE PINHEIRO
PRINCIPLES: THENEED FOR A CASE-SPECIFIC APPLICATION
Any analysis of Syrian law pertaining to the prospects of post-
war resettlement and restitution requires an underlying under-
standing of prevailing international law. The HLP rights120 of
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 199.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. The Syrian government even encouraged local authorities to elimi-
nate illegal houses pursuant to Decree 59 of 2008, but offered little incentive
to meet this obligation. Id.
119. Colin P. Kelley et al., Climate Change in the Fertile Crescent and Impli-
cations of the Recent Syrian Drought, 112 PNAS 3241N46 (2015).
120. Historically, property rights have been created and defined by national
law. John G. Sprankling, The Emergence of International Property Law, 90
N.C. L. REV. 461, 464 (2012). In the international system, each nation state
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refugees and displaced persons has been increasingly acknowl-
edged in international law.121 The Pinheiro Principles,122
adopted by the UN Sub-Commission on the Protection and Pro-
motion of Human Rights in 2005, represent the most compre-
hensive, explicit, and systematic formulation of the concept of
the right123 to post-conflict HLP restitution as a stand-alone
possesses territorial sovereignty, which entails its own property laws. Id.; see
also Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 572 (1823) (7[T]he title to lands, espe-
cially, is and must be admitted to depend entirely on the law of the nation in
which they lie. . . .5). See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONALLAW 535 (8th ed. 2012) (7Ownership in international law is nor-
mally seen either in terms of private rights under national law, which may
become the subject of diplomatic protection and state responsibility, or in terms
of territorial sovereignty.5).
121. Sprankling, supra note 120, at 464. HLP rights, understood as a notion
of post-conflict justice, have found expression in best-practice postulates, such
as the 3Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Repara-
tions for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ (7Basic Principles and
Guidelines5) and the 3Chicago Principles on Post-Conflict Justice.’
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION POLICY 273 (Mat-
thew Saul & James A. Sweeney eds., 2015).
122. The Pinheiro Principles are the fruition of a seven-year process that
started with the adoption of Sub-Commission resolution 1998/26 on Housing
and property restitution in the context of the return of refugees and internally
displaced persons, which was proceeded by a study between 2002N2005, and
then by the draft principles of Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro—the Sub-Commission
Special Rapporteur on Housing and Property Restitution. HANDBOOK ON
HOUSING AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS:
IMPLEMENTING THE 3PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES’ 11 (2007), http://www.ohchr.org/Doc-
uments/Publications/pinheiro_principles.pdf.
123. Note that the Pinheiro Principles are general principles of international
law, rather than a treaty or formal law. Therefore, they do not command the
same legal status accorded to such sources of international law. Id. at 19. Nev-
ertheless, they have 7persuasive authority and are explicitly based on existing
international, regional and national law.5 Id. (emphasis in original); See also
Prosecutor v. Erdemovi$, Case No. IT-96-22, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, ¶ 57 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-aso-
jmcd971007e.pdf (7[A]lthough general principles of law are to be derived from
existing legal systems, in particular, national systems of law, it is generally
accepted that the distillation of a 3general principle of law recognised by civi-
lised nations’ does not require the comprehensive survey of all legal systems of
the world.5); Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26,
1945 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
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right.124 6Jeh *'o%iOe tJat 7oa]ll refugees and displaced persons
have the right to have restored to them any housing, land and/or
property of which they were arbitrarily or unlawfully Oe*'i%eO5
o' 7to le Qom*ensateO5 iM 7an independent, impartial t'il&naH5
Jas Oete'mineO tJat s&QJ XT: 'esto'ation is 7factually impossi-
ble^5125 Furthermore, Principle 21 strictly ensures that restitu-
tion Qan 7onHh olen OeemeO MaQt&aHHh im*ossilHe in extreme cir-
Q&mstanQesb5 s*eQiMiQaHHh jJen 7Jo&sinLb HanO anO]o' *'o*e'th is
Oest'oheO o' jJen it no HonLe' eiistsb5126 rather than impossibil-
ities due to economic, political, or transitional considerations.127
The Pinheiro Principles, after all, are convinced that the right to
XT: 'estit&tion 7is essential to the resolution of conflict and to
post-conflict peace-building, safe and sustainable return and the
estalHisJment oM tJe '&He oM Haj^ ^ ^ ^5128
Indeed, the Pinheiro Principles present a useful legal, admin-
istrative, and enforcement guide for Syrian and international
124. Sprankling, supra note 120, at 494N95. James A. Sweeney also identifies
the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (7Guiding Principles5), issued
in 2001 by the Secretary General of the United Nations, as the other major
legal approach to the right of restitution as a stand-alone right for displaced
people. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION POLICY, su-
pra note 121, at 274. He asserts that the Guiding Principles 7express a signif-
icant preference for restitution but [unlike the Pinheiro Principles] did not de-
clare an individual 3right’ to restitution as such.5 Id.
125. Special Rapporteur on the Housing and Property in the Context of the
Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, Principles on Housing
and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Person, U.N. Sub-Com-
mission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Economic & Social
Rights Council, princ. 2.1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17; Comm’n of Human
Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion of Human Rights, 56th Sess. (June 28,
2005), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/idps/50f94d849/principles-hous-
ing-property-restitution-refugees-displaced-persons-pinheiro.html (emphasis
added) [hereinafter The Pinheiro Principles].
126. The Pinheiro Principles, supra note 125, princ. 21.2.
127. INTERNATIONALLAWANDPOST-CONFLICTRECONSTRUCTIONPOLICY, supra
note 121, at 274N75.
128. The Pinheiro Principles, supra note 125, pmbl. (emphasis added).
Sweeney also observes that the Pinheiro Principles notably declare that the
right to restitution 7is free-standing, rather than being derived from either the
right to return or the remedy to a particular human rights violation.5
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION POLICY, supra note
121, at 275. In addition, Megan Ballard has ascribed the Pinheiro Principles’
conception of restitution as essential to a conflict’s resolution to the lessons
garnered in Bosnia. Megan J. Ballard, Post-Conflict Property Restitution:
Flawed Legal and Theoretical Foundations, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 462, 484
(2010).
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stakeJoHOe's in%esteO in tJe Qo&nt'h’s *ost-conflict justice.129
Zo' instanQeb tJeh &nOe'sQo'e tJat anh 'eM&Lees’ o' Ois*HaQeO
*e'sons’ 'et&'n le 7laseO on a M'eeb inMo'meOb inOi%iO&aH
QJoiQeb5130 rather than out of political, economic, or transitional
coercion.131 This is an intuitively attractive option for Syrians
who no longer wish to reside in Syria for any plethora of reasons,
ranging from human or material loss and trauma132 to fear of
potential political reprisals.133 The Pinheiro Principles reaffirm
LenOe' e(&aHith anO 'eQoLnige 7tJe 'iLJts oM 'eM&Lee anO Ois`
*HaQeO jomen anO Li'Hsb5134 which is especially important for the
Syrian women and girls who have lost male relatives in the
war,135 and whose property rights were limited by restrictive
129. According to Sweeney, post-conflict justice is a victim-oriented idea that
73is premised on an understanding that domestic stability, security, and demo-
cratic governance in the aftermath of atrocity are strengthened by a commit-
ment to justice and accountability.’5 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION POLICY, supra note 121, at 275 (emphasis in original).
130. The Pinheiro Principles, supra note 125, pmbl.
131. The Pinheiro Principles state:
Refugees and displaced persons shall not be forced, or other-
wise coerced, either directly or indirectly, to return to their
former homes, lands or places of habitual residence. Refugees
and displaced persons should be able to effectively pursue du-
rable solutions to displacement other than return, if they so
wish,without prejudicing their right to the restitution of their
housing, land, and property.
Id. princ. 10.3 (emphasis added). See also id. princ. 10.4 (7Voluntary return in
safety and dignity must be based on a free, informed, individual choice.5).
132. Maria Hawilo, The Consequences of Untreated Trauma: Syrian Refugee
Children in Lebanon, 4(1) NW. PUB. HEALTHREV. 5, 5-12 (2017).
133. Lebanese Leaders Divided Over Fate of Syrian Refugees, FRANCE 24 (Oct.
10, 2016), http://www.france24.com/en/20171016-lebanon-aoun-hariri-hezbol-
lah-return-syrian-refugees.
134. The Pinheiro Principles, supra note 125, pmbl.; See also id. princ. 4.1
(ensuring 7the equal right of men and women, and . . . boys and girls, inter alia,
to voluntarily return in safety and dignity, local security of tenure, property
ownership, equal access to inheritance, as well as the use, control of and access5
to HLP); id. princ. 4.2 (calling for HLP restitution programs, policies, and prac-
tices that reflect 7a gender-sensitive approach.5).
135. As of October 2016, women headed 66,000 (approximately 31 percent) of
the 180,000 Syrian refugee families in Jordan registered with the U.N. High
Commissioner on Refugees. AnnM. Simmons,Widowed, divorced, abandoned0
Syrian refugee women forge new lives in Jordan, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2016),
http://www.latimes.com/world/global-development/la-fg-global-women-syrian-
refugees-snap-story.html.
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HeLaH inte'*'etations leMo'e tJe ja'’s QommenQement^136 Moreo-
ver, the Pinheiro Principles undertake the prohibition of both
7Oe MaQto anO Oe I&'e OisQ'imination5137 on tJe lasis oM 7'aQeb QoH`
our, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
o' soQiaH o'iLinb *'o*e'thb OisaliHithb li'tJ o' otJe' stat&s^5138
Such a provision is undoubtedly crucial for any society, espe-
cially Syria, where thorough examinations of the role of sec-
tarian, regional, and tribal loyalties are critical to understand-
inL tJe *atQJjo'k oM netjo'ks Qont'oHHeO lh tJe !a’atJ :a'th
and the Assad dynasty.139
Despite the laudable efforts of the Pinheiro Principles, the in-
sistence to the right of restitution programs has also posed chal-
lenges.140 In the past decade, in the aftermath of the successful
restitution program in postwar Bosnia, the world has witnessed
few unambiguously successful restitution programs, partly due
to the interplay of politics.141 Land and property are, after all,
136. Int’l Legal Assistance Consortium, ILAC Rule of Law Assessment Re-
port: Syria 2017 149 (2017), http://www.ilacnet.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/04/Syria2017.pdf.
137. The Pinheiro Principles, supra note 125, princ. 3.2.
138. Id. princ. 3.1.
139. See VANDAM, supra note 81.
140. See, e.g., Giulia Paglione, Individual Property Restitution: from Deng to
Pinheiro—and the Challenges Ahead, INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L., 391, 403 (2008)
(explaining how an almost exclusive focus on individual real property restitu-
tion pursuant to the Pinheiro Principles has 7entirely neglected5 alternative
remedies and non-returnees’ rights.); Miriam J. Anderson, The UN Principles
on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (The
Pinheiro Principles): Suggestions for Improved Applicability, 24 J. REFUGEE
STUD. 304, 304 (2011) (discussing how an exclusive focus on post-conflict resti-
tution of property overlooks many displaced people’s unwillingness to return
to their prewar residence, the displacement of secondary occupants, the timing
of repossession, the coordination of regional restitution regimes, and diverse
conceptions of property.); But see RETURNING HOME: HOUSING AND PROPERTY
RESTITUTION RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS 3-4 (Scott Leckie
ed., 2003); Dan E. Stigall, Refugees and Legal Reform in Iraq: The Iraqi Civil
Code, International Standards for the Treatment of Displaced Persons, and the
Art of Attainable Solutions, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 205, 205N38 (2008).
141. Rhodri C. Williams, Guiding Principle 29 and the Right to Restitution,
FORCED MIGRATION REV. 23 (Dec. 2008), http://www.fmre-
view.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/GuidingPrinciples10/williams.pdf
[hereinafter Williams, Guiding Principle 29]. The property restitution process
after the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina shaped the U.N. General Assem-
bly’s Basic Principles and Guidelines and support for the right to restitution
under the Pinheiro Principles. Id. In fact, the General Framework Agreement
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina provides that 7[a]ll refugees and displaced
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valuable assets that are subject to desired control by local and
national authorities, and in frozen conflicts, restitution is usu-
ally implausible.142 Even if political will for restitution exists,
many countries, including Syria at the moment and in the fore-
seeable future, do not enjoy the resources or legal capacity to ac-
QommoOate 'eM&Lees’ anO Ois*HaQeO *e'sons’ e(&italHe aQQess to
land.143 In addition, restitution programs face the immense task
of integrating customary tenure systems,144 which as indicated
above, remains a challenge in Syria.145 Furthermore, despite en-
joying support in various peacebuilding settings, the Pinheiro
Principles have yet to be widely applied through national laws
and policies.146 In places like Syria, where unequal property re-
lations may have helped sow the seeds of the conflict in the first
place, the restoration of the status quo ante via restitution is a
troublesome idea.147
persons . . . shall have the right to have restored to them their property of
which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be com-
pensated for any property that cannot be restored to them.5 General Frame-
work Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, at Annex
7, art. 1(1), ¶ 28 Dec. 14, 1995. The implementation of restitution was success-
ful in the Bosnia context, as over 200,000 property claims were resolved in six
years of postwar administration. Rhodri C. Williams, Post-Conflict Property
Restitution and Refugee Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Implications for
International Standard-Setting and Practice, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 441,
442N44 (2005).
142. Williams, Guiding Principle 29, supra note 141.
143. Id. For example, in Afghanistan, landlessness was already a common
phenomenon prior to displacement, and in Burundi, the population has almost
exceeded available land. Id.
144. Id. Rhodri Williams asserts that 7[w]hile traditional systems should be
respected, lack of state recognition and formal documentation often complicate
restitution claims. Customary systems are often nontransparent or even dis-
criminatory, complicating efforts to ensure that respect for collectively held
customary rights does not harm individuals.5 Id.
145. SeeNorwegian Refugee Council, Briefing Note: Housing Land and Prop-
erty (HLP) in the Syrian Arab Republic, 7N15 (May 2016),
https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/housing-land-and-property-hlp-
in-the-syrian-arab-republic.pdf.
146. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE ANDDISPLACEMENT 93 (Roger Duthie ed., 2012).
147. Id. at 95. In addition, land tenure experts at a research program hosted
by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London have dismissed the
Pinheiro Principles as 7shortsighted, dogmatic, and potentially counterproduc-
tive in humanitarian settings.5 Id.While the Pinheiro Principles do not condi-
tion restitution on the physical return of people, 7they do arguably reflect a
residual return bias in the notion of restitution as 3the preferred remedy for
displacement and as a key element of restorative justice.’5 Id. See also
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The scholar, Megan Ballard,148 lodges further reservations re-
garding what she considers to be the flawed legal and theoretical
foundations underlying the Pinheiro Principles in the context of
population displacement caused by armed conflict.149 For exam-
*Heb tJe :inJei'o :'inQi*Hes QaHH &*on 7oinnte'nationaH o'Laniga`
tions . . . [to] work with national Governments and share exper-
tise on the development of national housing, land and property
restitution policies and programmes and help ensure their com-
patibility with international human rights, refugee and human-
ita'ian Haj anO 'eHateO stanOa'Os^5150 Indeed, large-scale resti-
t&tion *'oQesses Ja%e 'eHieO Jea%iHh on Weste'n nations’ im*os`
ing or influencing law in recovering societies, resulting in unin-
tended, harmful consequences evoking imperialism.151While the
United Nations has declared that the right to return must be
voluntary,152 one such unintended consequence is the involun-
tary return of refugees living in asylum nations to their prewar
'esiOenQeb O&e to tJe ashH&m nations’ eQonomiQ anO *oHitiQaH Qon`
siderations.153 !aHHa'Ob tJe'eMo'eb QontenOs tJat 7*ost-conflict
property restitution schemes could benefit from considering the
. . . emphasis on broader human development and reconsidera-
tion of a one-size-fits-aHH moOeH oM 'eMo'm^5154
Past human rights cases, furthermore, inconsistently support
the Pinheiro PrinQi*Hes’ asse'tion tJat a 'iLJt eiists to *ostja'
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION POLICY, supra note
121, at 285.
148. Megan Ballard is a Professor of Law at Gonzaga University School of
Law. Our Faculty: Megan J. Ballard, J.D., GONZ. U., https://www.gon-
zaga.edu/academics/faculty-listing/detail/ballard (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
Her academic research focuses on refugee integration and post-conflict prop-
erty restitution. Id.
149. Ballard, supra note 128, at 462N96. Note that 7drawing a line between
3conflict’ and 3post-conflict’ is difficult.5World Bank, Post-Conflict Fund: Guide-
lines and Procedures 2 (1999).
150. The Pinheiro Principles, supra note 125, princ. 22.3.
151. Ballard, supra note 128, at 468, 492. Ballard points to the Bosnia epi-
sode as an illustration that international actors expropriated power over the
7drafting, adjudicating, and enforcing [of] local property laws.5 Id. at 470.
152. G.A. Res. 428 (V), ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Dec. 14, 1950).
153. Ballard, supra note 128, at 487N88; see also B.S. Chimni, Refugees, Re-
turn and Reconstruction of ‘Post-Conflict’ Societies: A Critical Perspective, 9
INT’L PEACEKEEPING 163, 163 (2002) (7Today, the return of refugees also coin-
cides with the disinclination of states to host refugees.5).
154. Ballard, supra note 128, at 473.
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housing restitution for refugees and displaced persons.155 The
scholar, James Sweeney,156 distinguishes the following three
groups of cases: (1) cases where the act of displacement is itself
tJe iss&eb fEd 7Qases in which restitution is featured as a remedy
for a human rights violation within the scope of the enforcement
loOhb5 anO fDd Qases jJe'e tJe inaliHith to *'o%iOe tJe 'iLJt oM
postwar restitution is deemed the infraction.157 It is the third
category of cases that indicates that human rights law does not
create a firm legal precedent for restitution.158
In cases where the act of displacement is itself the issue, case
law appears to support the Pinheiro Principles.159 In Sudan Hu-
man Rights Org. & Ctr. on Hous. Rights & Evictions (COHRE)
v. Sudanb tJe AM'iQan Commission on X&man anO :eo*Hes’
Rights addressed alleged state involvement in the forced dis-
placement of populations in Darfur and the perceived failure of
tJe 8&Oanese Lo%e'nment to *'e%ent 3'am*aLinL attaQks’ lh tJe
Janjaweedmilitia.160 6Je Commission JeHO tJat 8&Oan’s MaiH&'es
on these counts violated Article 14 of the African Charter on Hu-
man anO :eo*Hes’ 9iLJtsb jJiQJ aOO'esses tJe 'iLJt to *'o*`
erty.161 6Je Commissionb 7aja'e tJat tJe :inJei'o :'inQi*Hes a'e
L&iOeHines anO Oo not Ja%e anh Mo'Qe oM Hajb5 ei*HiQitHh QiteO to
155. INTERNATIONALLAWANDPOST-CONFLICTRECONSTRUCTIONPOLICY, supra
note 121, at 276.
156. James Sweeney is Professor of Law at Lancaster University Law School.
People: Professor James Sweeney, LANCASTER U. L. SCH., http://www.lancas-
ter.ac.uk/law/people/james-sweeney (last visited Jan. 15, 2018). His academic
research focuses on the after-effects of conflict, specifically the rights of refu-
gees and human rights in transitional democracies. Id.
157. INTERNATIONALLAWANDPOST-CONFLICTRECONSTRUCTIONPOLICY, supra
note 121, at 276.
158. Id.
159. Id. See, e.g., Akdivar v. Turkey, Application No. 21893/93, (1997) 23
EHHR 143 (upholding the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions); Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8,
Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Docu-
ments/Convention_ENG.pdf [hereinafter European Convention on Human
Rights] (upholding the right to respect for home, family, and private life). But
see European Convention on Human Rights, art. 15 (allowing derogation of
rights in time of emergency).
160. Sudan Human Rights Org. & Ctr. on Hous. Rights & Evictions (COHRE)
v. Sudan. App No 279/03-296/03, African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights, ¶¶ 3N4, ¶ 205 (May 27, 2009) [hereinafter COHRE v. Sudan].
161. Id. at ¶ 205.
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principles 5.3162 and 5.4163 oM tJe :inJei'o :'inQi*Hesb as 7tJeh
reflect the emerging principles in international human
'iLJts^5164
The second grouping of cases address the following two sub-
issues: (1) instances where there are inadequate human rights
reparations in domestic law, which lead to further distinct hu-
man 'iLJts %ioHations# anO fEd tJe iss&e oM inte'nationaH Qo&'ts’
anO t'il&naHs’ 'emeOiaH *oje's^165 Turning to the first issue, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) gives little guidance
on the optimal form of relief, but has held that a provision of
reparations is within the notion of the right to an effective rem-
edy, pursuant to the European Convention on Human Rights.166
162. Principle 5.3 declares that: 7States shall prohibit forced eviction, demo-
lition of houses and destruction of agricultural areas and the arbitrary confis-
cation or expropriation of land as a punitive measure or as a means or method
of war.5 The Pinheiro Principles, supra note 125, princ. 5.3.
163. Principle 5.4 declares that: 7States shall take steps to ensure that no one
is subjected to displacement by either State or non-State actors. States shall
also ensure that individuals, corporations, and other entities within their legal
jurisdiction or effective control refrain from carrying out or otherwise partici-
pating in displacement.5 The Pinheiro Principles, supra note 125, princ. 5.4.
164. COHRE v. Sudan, supra note 160, ¶¶ 203N204.
165. INTERNATIONALLAWANDPOST-CONFLICTRECONSTRUCTIONPOLICY, supra
note 121, at 277N81.
166. The European Court has held that the effect of Article 13 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, which addresses the right to an effective
remedy, is the following:
[T]o require the provision of a domestic remedy allowing the
competent national authority both to deal with the substance
of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant appropri-
ate relief, although Contracting States are afforded some dis-
cretion as to the manner in which they comply with their ob-
ligations under this provision.
Al Nashiri v. Poland, App. No. 28761/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 546 (2014) (emphasis
added); See also Vilvarajah and Others v. The United Kingdom, App. No.
13163/87; 13164/87; 13165/87; 13448/87, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 122 (1991). Note, how-
ever, that in most cases, the European Court has had the tendency to treat
Article 6 (right to a fair hearing)—not Article 13—as the lex specialis derogat
legi generali (7special law repeals general laws5) with regards to the sufficiency
of domestic remedies. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION POLICY, supra note 121, at 279.
In addition, in Akdivar v. Turkey, the European Court states:
[A] judgement in which it finds a breach imposes on the re-
spondent State a legal obligation to put an end to such breach
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The International Covenant on Civil Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (ICCPR), the Human Rights Committee (HRC),
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have more ex-
plicitly mentioned the possibility of restitution, with the Inter-
American Court prioritizing restitution.167 Turning to the second
issue, the requirement of reparations for human rights viola-
tions or infractions against individual criminal responsibility, as
and make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to
restore as far as possible the situation existing before the
breach (restitutio in integrum). However, if restituto in in-
tegrum is in practice impossible the respondent States are
free to choose the means whereby they will comply with a
judgment in which the Court has found a breach, and the
Court will not make consequential orders or declaratory
statements in this regard.
Akdivar v. Turkey, Application No. 21893/93, (1997) 23 EHHR 143 (non-Latin
emphasis added) [hereinafter Akdivar v. Turkey]. Sweeney poignantly indi-
cates that the Akdivar court’s 7threshold of 3in practice impossible’ is lower
than that in the Pinheiro Principles of 3factually impossible.’5 INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND POST-CONFLICTRECONSTRUCTION POLICY, supra note 121, at 279. It is
notable that the European Court has not supervised this element. Id.
167. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION POLICY,
supra note 121, at 277N78. The ICCPR HRC has stated the following:
Without reparations to individuals whose Covenant rights
have been violated, the obligation to prove effective remedy . .
. is not discharged. . . . In addition to the explicit reparation
required . . . the Committee considers that the Covenant gen-
erally entails appropriate compensation. The Committee
notes that, where appropriate, reparation can involve restitu-
tion, rehabilitation andmeasures of satisfaction, such as pub-
lic apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition
and changes in relevant laws and practices, as well as bring-
ing to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations.
UN Human Rights Committee, General comment no. 31 [80], The Nature of
the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant (26
May 2004) UN Doc OCPR/C/21/Revl/Add13, ¶ 16 (emphasis added). The Inter-
American Court arguably prioritizes restitution as a remedy for human rights
violations in domestic law, deeming them distinct infractions to the judicial
guarantees protections recognized pursuant to Articles 8(1) and 25(1) of the
American Convention. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION POLICY, supra note 121, at 278; see also Garcia Lucero et al
v. Chile, Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, and Reparations, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 627, ¶ 182 (Aug. 28, 2013).
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articulated in treaties168 and the interstate Draft Articles on Re-
sponsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,169 have
leen eitenOeO to inOi%iO&aHs’ QHaimalHe 'iLJts aLainst states in
both human rights and international criminal law courts and
tribunals.170 While it is possible, however, to interpret restitu-
tion to be the preferred remedy171 of cases in the International
Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of International Justice,
and the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts, the modus operandi of international hu-
man rights tribunals and courts is less consistent.172
168. See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights, art. 41; Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court art. 75, adopted July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
169. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrong-
ful Acts, Art. 31, 34-35, in Report of the International Law Commission on the
Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10 (2001); see also Factory at Chorzow (Germany v. Poland), 1928
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13), ¶¶ 55, 125 ([7T]he reparation due must, in
principle, take the form of the payment of compensation, a statement which is
moreover formally repeated in the Case. . . . Restitution in kind, or, if this is
not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution
in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which
would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it-such are
the principles which should serve to determine the amount of compensation
due for an act contrary to international law.5).
170. INTERNATIONALLAWANDPOST-CONFLICTRECONSTRUCTIONPOLICY, supra
note 121, at 279. For example, in Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, the Inter-
American Court agreed that 7[i]t is a principle of international law, which ju-
risprudence has considered 3even a general concept of law,’ that every violation
of an international obligation which results in harm creates a duty to make
adequate reparation.5Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 7 para. 25 (July 21, 1989). The Court continued, 7[r]epa-
ration of harm brought about by the violation of an international obligation
consists in full restitution (restitutio in integrum), which includes the restora-
tion of the prior situation, the reparation of the consequences of the violation,
and indemnification for patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages, including
emotional harm.5 Id. at ¶ 26.
171. Compensation and satisfaction, in this context, would qualify as second-
ary modes of remedy.
172. INTERNATIONALLAWANDPOST-CONFLICTRECONSTRUCTIONPOLICY, supra
note 121, at 280. For example, in Dagmar Brokova v. Czech Republic, the
ICCPR HRC held that an applicant was discriminately excluded from a resti-
tution scheme, reasoning that the Czech Republic was obliged to provide an
effective remedy pursuant to Article 2(3)(a) ICCPR. Dagmar Brokova v. Czech
Republic, Communication No. 774/1997, UN Soc. CCPR/C/73/D/774/1997 (15
January 2002), ¶ 9. The court reasoned, 7the State party is under an obligation
to provide the author with an effective remedy. Such remedy should include
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Finally, cases where the inability to provide the right of post-
war restitution is deemed the infraction present the most chal-
lenges, since human rights law does not appear to create a legal
foundation for restitution as an obligation. In Kopecky v. Slo-
vakia, the ECHR deliberated as to whether, under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1, the applicant could legitimately expect to claim
'estit&tion oM Jis MatJe'’s *'o*e'th^173 According to Sweeney, the
[CX9 JeHO tJat A'tiQHe G oM :'otoQoH Ro^ G 7Qannot be inter-
preted as imposing any general obligations upon contracting
states to restore property that was transferred to them before
tJeh 'atiMieO tJe Con%ention^5174
The underlying methodology of measuring Syrian law against
international human rights law, particularly the Pinheiro Prin-
ciples, ought to be one that recognizes that human rights law
does not sufficiently facilitate post-conflict restitution as the
*'inQi*aH 'es*onse to Ois*HaQementb 'atJe' tJan as 7onHh one
amongst several, potentially re-distril&ti%eb a**'oaQJes^5175
restitution of the property or compensation, and appropriate compensation for
the period during which the author and his widow were deprived of the prop-
erty.5 Id. (emphasis added). Here, the ICCPR HRC appears to treat restitution
and compensation as near-equal options, instead of explicitly prioritizing res-
titution as in the Pinheiro Principles. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION POLICY, supra note 121, at 280. See also COHRE v. Sudan,
supra note 160, ¶ 29 (explaining that Sudan should 7take measures to ensure
that the victims of human rights abuses are given effective remedies, including
restitution and compensation.5). (emphasis added).
173. Kopecký v. Slovakia, App. No. 44912/98, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 9), ¶
35 (2004) [hereinafter Kopecký v. Slovakia].
174. INTERNATIONALLAWANDPOST-CONFLICTRECONSTRUCTIONPOLICY, supra
note 121, at 282N83. See Kopecký v. Slovakia, supra note 173, ¶ 35 (7If the
Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols
thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows
only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just
satisfaction to the injured party.5) (emphasis added).
175. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION POLICY 276
(Matthew Saul & James A. Sweeney eds., 2015). Sweeney adds:
The response of human rights courts and tribunals to resti-
tution instead can be seen as taking place within a much
broader framework of contingencies and qualifications ap-
plied to the use of law during times of transition, and where
tJe a**'oaQJ to 'estit&tion is I&st one eiam*He oM 3t'ansitionaH
'eHati%ism’—where human rights international legal stand-
ards are modulated to accommodate transitional needs.
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While the Pinheiro Principles provide increasing understanding
of the needs of post-conflict societies, room may be allotted to
tailor a more context-specific approach to remedying the HLP
rights of displaced Syrian persons and refugees.176 In this con-
text, a strict, inflexible application of the Pinheiro Principles
would not only risk an inability to abide by these principles, but
could also result in their being undermined and decelerate any
international momentum towards adopting them.177
IV. RECONCILING SYRIANDOMESTIC LAW WITH THE PINHEIRO
PRINCIPLES: RECOMMENDATIONS
This Note has operated under the notion that much of postwar
Syria will likely be governed, to some extent, under the sphere
of the current Syrian government. The issue that arises is
whether or not current Syrian law can be renegotiated and
amended between the relevant warring parties to establish a
methodology of reconstruction that pays more than just lip ser-
vice to the rights befitting internally displaced Syrians and Syr-
ian refugees under the Pinheiro Principles. This Part will pre-
sQ'ile amenOments anO QHa'iMiQations to 8h'ia’s :&lHiQ-Private
:a'tne'sJi* f:::d Tajb TeLisHati%e reQ'ee Taj A oM E\G@ f7TeL`
isHati%e reQ'ee A5db aQQo'OinL to tJe s*i'it oM 8h'ia’s ToQaH
Id. at 272N73. See also Ballard, supra note 128, at 483 (explaining that postwar
property restitution is instead 7a new right based on the evolution of interna-
tional law, rather than one firmly grounded in international law.5).
176. The Principles 7shall not be interpreted as limiting, altering or otherwise
prejudicing the rights recognized under international human rights, refugee
and humanitarian law and related standards, or rights consistent with these
laws and standards as recognized under national law.5 The Pinheiro Princi-
ples, supra note 125, princ. 23.1 (emphasis added).
177. For example, according to the Pinheiro Principles, 7States shall prohibit
eviction, demolition of houses and destruction of agricultural areas and the
arbitrary confiscation or expropriation of land as a punitive measure or as a
means or method of war.5 The Pinheiro Principles, supra note 125, princ. 5.3.
According to rebel groups, however, Syrian state actors employed 7a scorched
earth policy to destroy the city [of Aleppo] and uproot its people.5 The Agony of
Aleppo, ECONOMIST (Oct. 1, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/middle-
east-and-africa/21707937-americas-ceasefire-deal-russia-never-stood-chance-
agony-aleppo. In at least the short term, the same Syrian state will rule the
country. Therefore, while this right of protection under the Pinheiro Principles
cannot be enforced, it is crucial to administer the principles under the pretense
that it will be impossible to enforce them cleanly. Otherwise, they stand little
chance of being relevant.
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Administ'ati%e Tajb TeLisHati%e reQ'ee Taj G\? oM E\GG f7TeL`
isHati%e reQ'ee G\?5d^178
The aim of these prescribed changes is to wield decentraliza-
tion as a tooH to st'enLtJen o'Oina'h 8h'ians’ %oiQes in tJe OeHil`
e'ations QonQe'ninL tJei' Qo&nt'h’s 'eQonst'&Qtion and its reset-
tlement of citizens. These recommendations also seek to mini-
mize corruption and cronyism that may be unresponsive to dis-
*HaQeO 8h'ians’ 'iLJts anO jJiQJ Qo&HO 'es&Ht M'om an o%e'Hh Qen`
tralized approach to reconstruction. These prescribed changes
recognize that the realization of a grand, centralized reconstruc-
tion is far-fetched. Finally, they seek to minimize the extensive
outsourcing of valuable reconstruction projects to international
urban development and architecture firms at the expense of
qualified Syrian firms, labor, and the people who once inhabited
these destroyed areas.
A. Analysis of Legislative Decree 107
Given the daunting costs of reconstruction179 and the lack of
*oHitiQaH Qa*itaH tJat AssaO’s Lo%e'nment jieHOs in manh *a'ts
of the international community,180 it is implausible that Syria
will be able to implement a grand, centralized, and national re-
Qonst'&Qtion *'oIeQt tJe Oah aMte' tJeja'’s Qessation^181 Instead,
there will be a lot of informal reconstruction, and the challenge
for the Syrian people will be how to manage this informality in
178. At the moment, there is 7no extant body of international law that pro-
vides generally applicable rules on post-conflict constitutional reform. . . .
[T]his is an area that has been largely practice driven, with policies formulated
as a result of reflection on practice rather than in response to legally mandated
requirements.5 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION
POLICY, supra note 121, at 122.
179. Lund, supra note 14.
180. Steve Scherer & Crispian Balmer, G7 Powers Seek Broad Support to Iso-
late Syria’s Assad, REUTERS (Apr. 11, 2017), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-
g7-foreign-syria/g7-powers-seek-broad-support-to-isolate-syrias-assad-idUK-
KBN17D0GC.
181. According to Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj, a Syrian architect and urban plan-
ner from Aleppo, 7[t]his notion that one day the conflict will stop and the next
day a grand national reconstruction will begin is a fake paradigm. There’s not
going to be a 3day after.’5 Sina Zekavat, Syrian Architects Challenge ‘Post-War’
Reconstruction with Real-Time Designs, GLOBAL VOICES (Oct. 15, 2017),
https://globalvoices.org/2017/10/15/syrian-architects-challenge-post-war-re-
construction-with-real-time-designs/.
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order to resettle their citizenry and rehabilitate their infrastruc-
ture, economy, and society.182
At this very moment, local councils operating in some opposi-
tion and Kurdish-held areas in Syria, have proliferated in the
alsenQe oM tJe 8h'ian Lo%e'nment’s *'esenQe^183 They base their
HeLitimaQh on tJe 8h'ian Lo%e'nment’s *assaLe oM TeLisHati%e
Decree 107 in August 2011.184 This decentralization law was leg-
islated as part of a bundle of reforms to appease the protests that
spread across the country.185 Legislative Decree 107 has fea-
tured extensively in ongoing peace negotiations between the var-
ious Syrian actors in Astana, Kazakhstan and Geneva, Switzer-
land.186 Its general acceptance has constituted a rare form of
agreement between the Syrian government, opposition factions,
the United States, and Russia.187 While it remains unclear how
Legislative Decree 107, or one of its future iterations, will be im-
plemented nationally, or what its consequences will be,188 this
182. Hallaj asserts that:
In reality urban growth will mainly take place in the informal
sector with a few exceptions where neoliberal policies will in-
centivize limited opportunities for the emerging war lords
anO tJei' 'eLionaH *a'tne's^ ^ ^ ^ 6Je'e’s *'olalHh LoinL to le
two or three such exceptions in Syria with beautiful land-
scapes and restored facades like in Beirut. . . . The rest of the
country is going to be desolate land.
Id.
183. Samer Araabi, Syria’s Decentralization Roadmap, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (Mar. 11, 2017), http://carnegieendow-
ment.org/sada/68372.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Under Legislative Decree 107, it is plausible that a more prominent local
council system may empower Syrian citizens to participate in their govern-
ment. Id. There also exists, however, a risk that this law could merely add
another layer of bureaucratic control that is unresponsive to citizens. Id. Fur-
thermore, Syria arguably may have already featured a system of decentraliza-
tion, in the sense that central authorities fostered relationships with local net-
works of religious leaders, business elites, and family notables. Kheder Khad-
dour, Local Wars and the Chance for Decentralized Peace in Syria, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (Mar. 28, 2017), http://carnegie-
mec.org/2017/03/28/local-wars-and-chance-for-decentralized-peace-in-syria-
pub-68369.
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Note asserts that it may form the basis of a decentralized recon-
struction scheme compatible with the Pinheiro Principles.189
TeLisHati%ereQ'ee G\?’s aim is to 7OeQent'aHige a&tJo'ities anO
responsibilities and concentrate them in the hands of the peo-
*He’s Lroups in accordance with the principle of democracy,
jJiQJ makes tJe *eo*He tJe so&'Qe oM aHH a&tJo'ith^ ^ ^ ^5190 This
law promotes political decentralization, increases financial re-
sources and revenues for local councils, and allows the local
councils to implement development plans in order to empower
local actors and their services.191 The President of Syria appoints
a Lo%e'no' to JeaO eaQJ *'o%inQe anO ens&'e tJat HoQaH Qo&nQiHs’
efforts comply with national strategies.192 The locally elected
councils under each governor are tasked with 7*HanninLb im*He`
mentinLb anO Oe%eHo*inL Qomm&nith Oe%eHo*ment *Hans5193 in
o'Oe' to aQJie%e 7eQonomiQb soQiaHb Q&Ht&'aH anO urban develop-
ment^5194 Under this national plan for decentralization, the local
councils can take all the meas&'es neQessa'h to a**'o%e 7a'QJi`
teQt&'aH anO &'lan shstems5195 aQQo'OinL to tJe Hajb to 7QJanLe
tJe aHHoQation oM *&lHiQ *'o*e'th oM tJe Qith o' tojnb5196 and to
estalHisJb manaLeb anO in%est in tJe 7Qonst'&Qtion oM Qitiesb
buildings, playgrounds, and sportinL MaQiHities^5197
While Legislative Decree 107 represents a drastic departure
M'om *'eja' 8h'ia’s Qent'aHigeO state a**a'at&sb198 its chal-
lenges are threefold. First, the law has arguably lacked
189. Much of the prevailing literature mentioning Legislative Decree 107 al-
ludes to it as a decentralized approach to empowering local authorities, ad-
dressing local grievances, and fostering social cohesion and reconciliation. It
falls short, however, of explicitly detailing legal steps of reconciling this provi-
sion with Legislative Decree 5 and the HLP rights of displaced Syrians. See,
e.g.Maya Yahya & Jean Kassir, Coming Home? A Political Settlement in Syria
Must Focus on Refugees, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
(Mar. 30, 2017), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Yahya_Syrian_Refu-
gees.pdf.
190. Legislative Decree 107 of Aug. 23, 2011 (Local Administrative Law), § 1,
ch. 1, art. 2(1) (Syria).
191. Id. § 1, ch. 1, arts. 2(1), 2(3).
192. Id. § 4, ch. 1, arts. 39N41.
193. Id. § 1, ch. 1, art. 2(2).
194. Id. (emphasis added).
195. Id. § 5, ch. 1, art. 60(4).
196. Id. § 5, ch. 1, art. 60(7).
197. Id. § 5, ch. 1, art. 60(14).
198. Araabi, supra note 183.
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implementation.199 Local level investments, in the aftermath of
tJe TeLisHati%ereQ'ee G\?’s *assaLeb leQame OiMMiQ&Ht leQa&se oM
the devaluation of the Syrian pound and the diversion of the Syr-
ian state budget towards the war effort.200 Therefore, implemen-
tation of the law became difficult and was relegated to sewer
maintenance and solid-waste management.201 Furthermore,
when local elections were held on December 12, 2011, only about
43,000 candidates ran for 17,629 seats.202 As much as 15 percent
of the local councils could not be filled.203 Therefore, a postwar
environment may usher in more non-military investment and
increased civic participation based in necessity and opportuni-
ties to serve local self-interests, rather than in admiration for
President Assad. The extent of any such increased implementa-
tion of Legislative Decree 107, however, is admittedly uncer-
tain.204
Second, Kurdish-controlled areas have enjoyed autonomy and
will likely resist returning power back to the Syrian government
in compliance with Legislative Decree 107.205 It is premature to
gauge what would happen in this scenario, but this source of
tension may necessitate a renegotiation of the law that liberal-
izes it or affords the Kurds some autonomy within the legal
framework.206 Certainly, amending Legislative Decree 107 will
likely be necessary for various reasons.
One major reason to amend Legislative Decree 107 is the third
challenge it poses: the disputed role and authority of governors
199. Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj, Geographies of Absence: Radicalization and the
Shaping of the New Syrian Territoriality, 29 NEW ENG. J. PUB. POLICY 1, 16
(2017).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Hallaj argues that while decentralization failed in the aftermath of Leg-
islative Decree 107’s passage, the Syrian government did decentralize its local
military control by creating private and local militias to defend their neighbor-
hoods against Syrian and foreign opposition rebel groups. Id. The localization
of the conflict and the creation of checkpoints not only reduced civilian move-
ment, but created a situation where 7[e]ach political stakeholder has its power
situated in and dependent on a different type of territoriality.5 Id. at 17. Ac-
cording to Hallaj, such asymmetry 7will constitute the first challenge for the
peace process because the interests and powers of each of the actors are clearly
situated at different ends of the scale.5 Id.
205. Araabi, supra note 183.
206. Id.
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pursuant to the statute.207 6Je Haj states tJat 7otnJe Lo%e'no'
shall take an oath to the President of the Republic before under-
takinL tJe O&ties oM tJe oMMiQe^5208 6Je Lo%e'no' is aHso 7a**ointeO
and relieved of his post by decree and shall be considered a mem-
le' oM tJe eieQ&ti%e a&tJo'ith^5209 According to Legislative De-
Q'ee G\?b tJe Lo%e'no'’s O&ty of loyalty arguably lies, first and
foremost, in the Syrian President who selects him or her, rather
than his or her Syrian constituents, who do not have the agency
to %ote Mo' tJis *i%otaH Qent'aH MiL&'e^ Z&'tJe'mo'eb 7otnJe Lo%e'`
nor represents the central authority in the governorate and
jo'ks Mo' aHHminist'ies^5210 While the law strives to decentralize
*oHitiQaH *oje' anO to 7enalHe otJe HoQaH Qo&nQiHsn to M&HMiHH tJei'
responsibilities in improving the administrative unit economi-
cally, socially, culturaHHhb anO in &'lan Oe%eHo*mentb5211 its re-
forms would be more far-reaching and responsive to individual
Syrians if each governor overlooking the councils was democrat-
ically elected by Syrian citizens.212 Therefore, this Note pre-
scribes an amendment to Legislative Decree 107 establishing
the governor as a representative of the central authority who is
elected by, and may only be impeached by, his or her constitu-
ents.
B. Reconciling Legislative Decree Law 5 with Syrian HLP
Rights
In 2016, Syrian Prime Minister, Wael al-Halqi, announced
that Syria was transitioning from a social market economic
moOeH to jJat tJe Lo%e'nment te'meO as 7RationaH :a'tne'`
sJi*b5 jJiQJ aHH&Oes to estalHisJinL *&lHiQ-private
207. Id.
208. Legislative Decree 107 of Aug. 23, 2011 (Local Administrative Law), § 4,
ch. 1, art. 40 (Syria).
209. Id. § 4, ch. 1, art. 39.
210. Id. § 4, ch. 1, art. 41.
211. Id. § 1, ch. 1, art. 2(1).
212. Again, the prospects of such an amendment will be subject to political
negotiations between the warring Syrian parties and their benefactors. This
Note envisions that opponents of the Syrian government will logically seek the
decentralization of President Assad’s power by leveraging the extensive eco-
nomic resources of theirWestern and Gulf allies and supporters as part of post-
war reconstruction. The Syrian government may leverage its decisive battle-
field gains and the return of Syrian refugees residing outside its borders to
keep President Assad in power, to ensure that he regains a stable and func-
tioning state, and to reintegrate Syria into the global order.
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partnerships.213 TeLisHati%ereQ'ee Taj Ab 8h'ia’s nej ::: Tajb
prominently features this emphasis on public-private partner-
ships.214 6Je Haj enalHes tJe *'i%ate seQto' to in%est in anO 7Oe`
sign, construct, implement, maintain, rehabilitate, develop,
manage, or operate public utilities, infrastructure, or projects
owned by tJe *&lHiQ seQto'^5215 6Je Haj aims to 7ens&'e t'ans`
parency, non-discrimination, equal opportunity, and competi-
ti%enessb5216 anO tJe *'i%ate *a'tne' 7lea's M&HH 'es*onsiliHith
anO 'isk5217 for financing and implementing its obligations be-
fore transferring the property back to the State.218
Legislative Decree Law 5, however, suffers from three imped-
iments. First, the law risks returning Syria to the same neolib-
eral policies that benefitted certain private actors and exacer-
bated the mass migration of Syrians from rural areas to informal
housing in urban centers.219 Indeed, it has been met with some
skepticism by Syrian parliamentarians, who fear it could benefit
*'i%ate anO Mo'eiLn l&sinesses at tJe *eo*He’s ei*ense^220 Sec-
ond, the law vests coordination of all public-private partnerships
in the Participation Council,221 which is a highly centralized
body headed by the PrimeMinister that includes only temporary
participation by governors.222 Such a law appears to backtrack
from the spirit of decentralization ushered in by Legislative
213. National Partnerships: Syria’s New Economic Order, SYRIAN L. J. (Mar.
18, 2016), http://www.syrianlawjournal.com/index.php/national-partnership-
syrias-new-economic-order/.
214. Id. It is plausible that the Electricity Investment Law 32/2010, which
emphasizes public-private partnerships by inviting local and foreign investors
to participate in power-related infrastructure projects, will also prominently
feature in some form during reconstruction. Id.
215. Legislative Decree Law No. 5 of Jan. 10, 2016 (Public-Private Partner-
ship Law), § 1, art. 2(a) (Syria).
216. Id. § 1, art. 2(c).
217. Id. § 5, art. 57(a)(1).
218. National Partnerships: Syria’s New Economic Order, supra note 213.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Legislative Decree Law No. 5 of Jan. 10, 2016 (Public-Private Partner-
ship Law), § 2, art. 7(a) (Syria).
222. Id. § 2, arts. 7(b)(1)N7(b)(10). The Board of Directors of the Participation
Council includes the following individuals: the Prime Minister, the Deputy
Prime Minister for Services Affairs, the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic
Affairs, the Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade, the Minister of Finance,
the Minister of Presidential Affair, the Chairman of the Planning and Interna-
tional Cooperation Authority, two independent experts appointed by the Coun-
cil of Ministers, and the Chairman of the Expert Group of the Bureau. Id.
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Decree 107. Third, the law lacks any controls or regulations that
reserve a role in postwar reconstruction for Syrian laborers and
architecture, urban planning, and development firms.
Turning to the first point, this Note prescribes an explicit anti-
corruption clause and a provision subjecting all parties in the
PPP transaction to international, independently-monitored ap-
praisal and audit committees. Assuming a cessation in hostili-
ties, any incarnation of a Syrian state will emerge from the cur-
rent conflict with very limited resources and, presumably, mini-
mal negotiating power at its disposal with wealthy development
Qom*anies^ Z&'tJe'mo'eb *ostja' 8h'ia’s shstem oM no'ms miti`
LatinL QonMHiQts letjeen OiMMe'ent Qomm&nities anO 7*eo*He’s
conception of a legitimate political order and its associated
stanOa'Os in 'eHation to oMMiQes anO *ositions oM t'&st5 jiHH HikeHh
be rudimentary or even missing, particularly in areas long occu-
pied by opposition rebel groups, because of the nature of war and
the breakdown of political order.223 Therefore, these amend-
ments ensure that postwar profiteering and bribery is mini-
mized224 anO tJat *'i%ate entities *a'tiQi*atinL in 8h'ia’s 'eQon`
struction remain accountable, transparent, and timely in afford-
ing refugees and displaced persons their HLP rights, as en-
shrined by Pinheiro Principles 12.1225 and 21.2.226
223. CORRUPTION AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING: SELLING THE PEACE?
32 (Dominik Zaum & Christine Cheng eds., 2011).
224. An anti-corruption provision might actually benefit the Syrian Govern-
ment because it would allow Assad to dispel any popular discontent with his
government’s handling of economic and reconstruction policies. It could plau-
sibly reestablish the federal government’s power amid the rise of the informal
war economy and decentralized militias. Even President Hafez al-Assad un-
dertook such a measure in 1977. VANDAM, supra note 81, at 73. The elder As-
sad formed a Committee for Investigation of Illegal Profits 7to investigate
crimes of bribery, imposition of influence embezzlement, exploitation of office
and illegal profits.5 Id. Hafez al-Assad’s anti-corruption campaign intended to
drive away the corruption plaguing his government’s bureaucracy and to elim-
inate widespread criticism of his handling of the economy. Id. Note, however,
that the 1977 anti-corruption campaign failed because indispensable members
of Assad’s inner circle and `Alawi sect were also guilty of involvement in cor-
rupt practices. Id. Such a quandary may again present itself today.
225. Principle 12.1 declares, in part, that: 7States should establish and sup-
port equitable, timely, independent, transparent and non-discriminatory pro-
cedures, institutions and mechanisms to assess and enforce housing, land and
property restitution claims.5 The Pinheiro Principles, supra note 125, princ.
12.1.
226. Principle 21.2 states:
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8eQonOb tJisRote 'eQommenOs tJat tJe :a'tiQi*ation Co&nQiH’s
composition for each project should include the permanent, man-
datory participation of democratically-elected governors, whose
jurisdictions have a direct interest in the project and its corre-
sponding contracts. Explicit acknowledgment of Legislative De-
Q'ee G\? anO tJe HoQaH Qo&nQiHs’ *oje's to *a'tiQi*ate in HoQaH 'e`
construction and resettlement projects ought to be added to Leg-
islative Decree Law 5 as well. These measures will not only add
an extra layer of transparency, scrutiny, and public deliberation
over the resettlement and restitution rights of refugees and dis-
placed persons,227 but they can also enhance civic engagement
and strengthen any demoralized or underdeveloped local insti-
tutions. Such decentralization and democratization, recognizing
that a top-Oojn Qent'aHigeO 'eQonst'&Qtion sQJeme’s M'&itionjiHH
be limited to a few localities, will allow ordinary Syrian actors to
regroup their assets and maximize local resources in a multi-
territorial approach.
Finally, this Note recommends that Legislative Decree Law 5
contain explicit provisions reserving and allotting economic op-
portunities and participation in the reconstruction process for
Syrian laborers and Syrian architecture, urban planning, and
development firms. Should the quality of the project proposal of
a Syrian company mirror that of a foreign company, the Syrian
entity ought to be given the contract. Such measures would de-
%eHo* 8h'ia’s J&man Qa*itaHb Q'eate em*Hohment Mo' 'et&'ninL
Syrian refugees who have been dependent on unskilled labor
anO aiO *'oL'amsb 'eO&Qe 8h'ian Qitigens’ Oe*enOenQe on aiO *'o`
grams within their own country, empower Syrian visionaries
and voices with the opportunity to architecturally engage war-
time memory and national healing, and redevelop
International financial, trade, development and other related
institutions and agencies, including member or donor States
that have voting rights within such bodies, should take fully
into account the prohibition against unlawful or arbitrary
displacement and, in particular, the prohibition under inter-
national human rights law and related standards on the
practice of forced evictions.
Id. princ. 21.2.
227. Id. princ. 12.1.
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neighborhoods and city centers in amanner that is more mindful
oM tJei' MeHHoj Qitigens’ jeHMa'e^228
CONCLUSION
The Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad and the
international community have already started to contemplate
postwar reconstruction and even wartime reconstruction, as the
Syrian conflict continues to wage on.229 Reconstruction is a pro-
cess that begins during war, but the notion that Syria will be
able to implement a grand, centralized reconstruction project af-
te' tJe ja'’s Qessation is an &n'eaHistiQ *a'aOiLmb Li%en tJe im`
mense costs that the Syrian government cannot plausibly ad-
dress.230 Therefore, it is imperative that policymakers, negotia-
to'sb anO Hajmake's 'e*'esentinL 8h'ia’sja''inL *a'ties Oelate
and negotiate existing Syrian domestic law, which appears
likely to persist in some form, in order to anticipate and accom-
modate the rights of displaced Syrians and Syrian refugees. This
discourse necessitates an understanding of the rapid urbaniza-
tion and proliferation of informal housing spurred by prewar,
neoliberal government policies, which led to massive discontent
in Syria.231
8h'ia’s ToQaH AOminist'ati%e Tajb TeLisHati%eDecree Law 107,
if amended to democratize the institution of the Syrian gover-
norship, is an effective starting point that presents decentrali-
zation as a pivotal tool to empower sustainable reconstruction
eMMo'ts tJat a'e mo'e minOM&H oM tJe Qo&nt'h’s 'et&rning refugees
and displaced persons. Its incorporation alongside an amended
%e'sion oM 8h'ia’s :&lHiQ-Private Partnership Law, Legislative
reQ'ee Taj Ab Qo&HO saMeL&a'O aLainst a 'e*etition oM 8h'ia’s Oet`
rimental, neoliberal policies leading up to the conflict, as well as
aLainst al&ses Oi'eQteO aLainst 'eM&Lees’ anO Ois*HaQeO *e'sons’
228. According to Hallaj:
[E]very line [architects and planners] put on [their] draw-
ing[s] will decide who gets to come back to the city and who
Ooesn’t Let to Qome laQk^ WM ho& Oo lea&tiful grand projects,
that some big developer is likely to develop, most likely peo-
ple will not be able to return to their cities.
Zekavat, supra note 181.
229. Lund, supra note 14.
230. Butter, supra note 27.
231. Goulden, supra note 51, at 195.
2018] Syria Under Pinheiro 755
HLP rights under the Pinheiro Principles. Such recommended
measures would once again empower the individuals who have
lost the most during the Syrian conflict: ordinary Syrian citi-
zens.
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